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Autonomic Computing Architecture for SCADA 
Cyber Security  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive computing relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the disciplines of 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These technologies can be 
used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment and can 
autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation.  IBM first used the term ‘Autonomic 
Computing’ in 2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has 
been inspired by the human biological autonomic system. An autonomic system is self-healing, self-
regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should be 
able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator. 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to monitor and control 
complex infrastructures of national importance such as transportation networks, power generation and 
manufacturing plants. SCADA systems can be visualised as a layered architecture, as shown in Figure 1. 
The field devices (sensors, etc.) at the lowest layer interact with the physical processes. At layer 2, the 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) aggregate data values from 
the lower layer and communicate the commands and their responses through the communications 
network to the SCADA server and Human Machine Interface (HMI). The generation of commands at the 
top layer and collection of responses from the lowest layer results in the monitoring and control of the 
process. The applicability of SCADA systems has become widespread due to industrial automation, cost 
reduction and growth in global economies (Nazir et al., 2017). 
 
Fig. 1. Layered Architecture of a SCADA system. 
 
 Traditionally, SCADA systems were developed as closed systems with security being the overriding 
factor, and no Internet connectivity. However, to leverage efficiency and gain a competitive advantage, 
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the systems are increasingly becoming connected to the Internet and cloud technologies. SCADA system 
security vulnerabilities were first highlighted by the Stuxnet attack (Karnouskos, 2011). Subsequently, 
there has been an increase in the frequency and sophistication, of the attacks as evidenced by Constantin 
(2014). 
Isolation and obscurity as a mechanism for protection is no longer an option for critical infrastructures 
(Mahoney and Gandhi, 2011). At the same time systems are getting so complex that it is difficult to 
develop effective defence strategies, as there is a lack of understanding of the complex interactions 
between the many system entities (Khadraoui and Feltus, 2015). Digital forensics becomes difficult due 
to the increased numbers and complexity of the cases (Taveras, 2013). The systems complexity and 
interactions go beyond the capability of system developers and integrators as a result of interconnectivity 
(Kephart and Chess, 2003). Thus, increasingly there is a lack of understanding of the holistic system, 
which makes it very difficult to tune a system and to make decisions in case of changed requirements. 
This has led to a realization that conventional and inflexible techniques will not help. What is needed is a 
new way of looking at the problem of cyber security that is robust, manageable and self-realising with a 
minimum requirement to monitor systems to make decisions. What is proposed is an entirely new way of 
thinking about the problem where the system itself is intelligent and helps to maintain and extend its 
behaviour, with the use of autonomic computing (Kephart and Chess, 2003).  
The basic principles of autonomic computing are highly relevant for the protection of the increasingly 
complex SCADA system because: (i) the boundaries between physical and virtual systems have been 
blurred through virtualisation. It is possible to host a cluster of machines in a virtual environment; (ii) 
even with hardware there are sufficient advances in other domains with self-healing materials; (iii) 
advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence and the knowledge base need to be capitalised for 
protection; (iv) the systems are highly interconnected and the distributed nature of the systems pose an 
exponential complexity. 
There has been some research on autonomic computing applications to complex SCADA systems. 
The application of autonomic computing for smart grids has been discussed (Greer and Rodriguez-
Martinez, 2012) as a solution to manage system complexities. Key components of a self-protecting 
SCADA system have been proposed and a survey of techniques provided for the realisation of such 
systems (Chen Abdelwahed, 2014). Also, there are few dedicated research groups (Autonomic 
Computing Lab; Cloud and Autonomic Computing Centre; Fortes et al., 2014) focusing research on the 
applicability of autonomic computing to cyber security. JADE (JADE, 2009) provides a framework for 
building autonomic management systems.  A test bed was developed for modelling critical 
infrastructures for testing autonomic technologies (Autonomic Computing  Lab; Cox, 2011).  
However, there is a lack of progress in developing architectures to support applications before the full 
potential of autonomic computing for SCADA security can be realised.  We propose to use the 
autonomic computing paradigm features to SCADA system security, in particular focussing on self-
protecting SCADA systems. This paper incorporates autonomic computing paradigm elements to extend 
the SCADA architecture to safeguard against the emerging cyber security challenges and threats facing 
SCADA industrial applications.  
 In section 2 the relevant features of SCADA systems are described. Cognitive computing is discussed 
in section 3. Section 4 covers the autonomic computing paradigm. Section 5 proposes the architectural 
framework for SCADA cyber security and finally section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. SCADA SYSTEMS   
VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS LANDSCAPE 
SCADA systems were developed to be used as stand-alone systems which by their very nature made it 
difficult for an outside attacker to exploit the system. However, the many benefits associated with 
interconnecting the system to the Internet have transformed the SCADA systems into a highly 
interconnected system (Taveras, 2013; Nazir et al., 2017) accessible over the Internet (Fig 2). Therefore 
the protection offered by an unconnected SCADA system is not available anymore. The benefits are too 
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lucrative to be ignored by vendors and industry. Unfortunately it comes with an increased exposure to 
threats. The system interactions are complex, opening new threat entry points as there are many third 
party libraries and hardware assembled with components from around the world, with exploitable threats 
such as backdoors, often unknown to the SCADA system vendor. 
The systems developers design customized solutions to address a particular problem. The systems are 
fairly long term deployments as the controlled processes have large financial and industrial outlays. The 
criticality of maintaining the process means that the systems remain in continuous operation and have a 
range of redundancies incorporated to protect stalling the system for foreseeable problems. 
SCADA communications protocols such as Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP), IEC 870-5 
and T103 are described by GE Communications Protocol. Most SCADA communications protocols have 
no encryption as they were designed when the SCADA systems existed only as stand-alone systems, 
rendering protocol authentication unnecessary. The Modbus protocol is one of the most common 
protocols for SCADA systems that operate on simple request-response messaging (Al Baalbaki et al., 
2013). The diversity of the protocols and their inoperability also creates obstacles to design secure 
communications (Sheldon et al., 2004). There are many publicly available tools that can capture network 
traffic wirelessly. Also the wireless devices that feed data to the SCADA system provide easy entry 
points for the intruder into the system because the end devices do not have adequate protection, due to 
very low power requirements. 
SCADA application vendors design their software to be hosted on generic operating systems such as 
Windows and Linux variants for widespread deployments; however, this makes SCADA applications 
exposed to the same vulnerabilities as that of the operating system.  The long operational lifetime of 
SCADA software means that the host operating system may be beyond technical support. The features 
being added to the SCADA systems add further complexity and the systems become difficult to develop 
and maintain. Thus it becomes difficult to understand and restore systems to their operational state from 




Fig. 2. Multiple pathways and Internat Connectivity to a Production System. 
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 The cyber attack paradigms have progressed much beyond the simple attack methodologies such as 
man-in-the-middle (MITM) and Denial of Service (DOS) attacks (Chen and Abdelwahed, 2014), and are 
waged with increasing sophistication to hide detection. The traditional defence approaches are unable to 
cope with the latest attack methodologies where for example, the system parameters are altered, and are 
individually legitimate, but on the whole result in system collapse. Correct operation of the system needs 
not only the correct commands but commands that are consistent with the prevailing state of the system. 
It is possible for an attacker to inject a valid sequence of commands that gradually take the system to an 
unstable condition. The systems also operate under very tight timing constraints and can have undesired 
consequences in case of timing violation. Even the smallest intrusions on the critical infrastructure 
controls, can result in malfunctions which have devastating ripple effects on the system as a whole. The 
system is susceptible to attacks with minor effects, which can alter the system behaviour in a negative 
manner, leading to a ripple effect that compromises the whole system. The SCADA system entities are 
generally spread over a large geographical area, thus necessitating synchronisation of information at each 
location. 
 The threat landscape is rapidly evolving (Khadraoui and Feltus, 2015) and has gained momentum 
because the SCADA systems are now accessible over the Internet, and are no longer protected by 
obscurity as the communications protocols and characteristics are available to interested parties. 
Currently, both the state and non-state agents are trying to exploit the system’s vulnerabilities. Cox 
(2011) discusses in detail threat ontologies. 
In contrast to the attacks launched from outside, threats can also emanate from an innocent or 
deliberate mistake from an insider. Such attacks could cause more harm as they could be launched with 
some understanding about the system operation.  
 PROTECTION SCHEMES 
Some recent technology adoptions and improvements in the SCADA systems are promising to aid 
developing systems that can result in an autonomic SCADA system. System protection can be ensured 
through many techniques. The majority depend on the judgement of a human to provide safeguards for 
the system.  
 The latest trends and innovations, such as virtualisation, analytics and databases, and wireless 
communications, which must work together in close collaboration to achieve the system mission, have 
been applied to SCADA systems. The integrated framework can rightly be called systems of systems as 
the complexity has increased beyond simple control and monitoring tasks, the fundamental basis of 
SCADA. This complexity implies that developing and maintaining such systems are reaching the limits 
of human cognition (Kephart and Chess, 2003; Huebscher and McCann, 2008). 
System vendors have been cognisant of the prevailing cyber security environment and have added a 
number of features to the product offerings. These features include, for example multiplexing proxy, 
encryption and role based access to make the intruder’s task difficult. Most SCADA vendors allow 
integration with relational databases in addition to the built-in historical databases that have some 
advantages (SQL). Relational databases such as Oracle have their own integrated analytics and data 
mining services that can make it easier to uncover any anomalous activity. 
The machine learning and data analytics techniques have revolutionised many application domains 
and have recently been introduced in SCADA applications software. Such native integration makes it 
easier for the SCADA developers to analyse the  systems operations and identify impending attacks 
(Kirsch et al., 2014; Carcano et al., 2011). Machine learning and other such techniques can effectively 
analyse a system to detect anomalous activities. Such unsupervised anomaly detection schemes are 
more appropriate and efficient compared to human analysts (Jiang and Yasakethu, 2013) and other 
signature based approaches (Chen Abdelwahed, 2014). The system can thus learn new approaches and 
provide defence against as yet unseen scenarios, as in the case of supervised learning approaches. The 
other techniques of interest could be based on agent based, artificial intelligence, and adaptive systems 
(Greer and Rodriguez-Martinez, 2012). The future of cyber security lies with exploiting such techniques 
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that can not only autonomously assess the threats to the system security, but also contain and mitigate 
the threat from spreading, resulting in more damage. The operator alert can notify the human operator to 
initiate disaster recovery operations. 
 Virtualisation techniques provide many benefits that can advantageously be applied to support the 
autonomic computing paradigm. Virtualisation enables easy containment of an attack, restoring and 
disaster recovery, change and optimisation of system resources, etc., in a truly elastic manner. 
A recent breakthrough in this direction is that of the Autonomic Computing paradigm. With 
Autonomic Computing, the ultimate control still rests with a human but the drudgery of data 
manipulation and threat assessment can be taken out of the loop. 
3. COGNITIVE INFORMATICS AND COMPUTING 
Cognitive Informatics is a broad and multidisciplinary field of cognition and information sciences that 
investigates the human information processing and its applicability for computing applications. A 
comprehensive review of the cognitive informatics framework is provided by Wang (2007a) and it also 
describes the applications from the fields of computing and software engineering. It uses Concept 
Algebra (CA), Real-Time System Algebra (RTPA) and System Algebra (SA) to formulate and represent 
knowledge using a formal notation. It can have diverse goals based on the application field but the 
overriding aim is to improve the human-machine interaction through better decision making. The hard 
problems in various engineering and scientific fields can be solved much easily if we knew the cognitive 
processes of the human brain (Wang, 2007a). For example, object recognition and classification problem 
in computer vision is hard for computers but comes naturally to humans, where a lot of progress has been 
made by mimicking the cognitive processes of the brain through Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). 
Similarly, the application of machine learning and agent based processing can help overcome the cyber 
threats facing the SCADA systems. 
 The theoretical framework for cognitive informatics and cognitive computing is presented by Wang et 
al. (2015) using a reductive model of the brain. It has been argued that the brain and natural intelligence 
can be explained through the reductive hierarchy at different levels. 
 The cognitive processes of formal inferences are described by Wang (2011b) cover both the applied 
and theoretical research processes using Real-Time Process Algebra (RTPA). It theorizes and 
demonstrates how the formal inferences in the human brain can be described using the cognitive 
processes of deduction, induction, abduction, and analogy. It provides a set of mathematical models and 
cognitive process for formal inference.  This formalization of models is also helpful to design the 
intelligent computers based on Cognitive Computing (CC).  
 Cognitive computing comprises of intelligent computing methodologies to build autonomous systems 
that mimic the inference mechanisms of the human brain (Wang, 2009). Thus a system can detect 
anomalies, events and entities in a system through pattern recognition and data mining. These pro-active 
and self-learning systems can provide an effective defence against cyber threats, as signature based 
approaches can only work against known threats, It is also very important for critical infrastructure cyber 
security systems that the threat is anticipated and predicted before it strikes, otherwise it could be 
difficult to contain the resulting damage.   
 The future developments in the field of cognitive informatics have been described by Wang et al. 
(2011a; 2011c). The advances in the field of cognitive informatics have led to the development of 
cognitive computing. Computing can be classified at four levels in computation intelligence: data, 
information, knowledge, and intelligence (Wang et al., 2011c; 2015). Data and information processing 
have been well studied but the same has not been the case for the higher levels of computational 
intelligence are yet to be studied. This will foster an era of an intelligent revolution that will meet the 
human needs of wisdom and intelligence. Highly intelligent systems will be accessible to ordinary people 
to solve everyday problems (Wang et al., 2015). The recent trend of “Cognitive processes of the brain, 
particularly the perceptive cognitive processes, are the fundamental means for describing autonomic 
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computing systems, such as robots, software agent systems, and distributed intelligent networks.” 
(Wang, 2007b).   
4. AUTONOMIC COMPUTING PARADIGM 
The roots of autonomic computing can be traced to the work by Norbett Wiener, John von Neumann, 
Alan Turing, and Claude E. Shannon on automata (Wang, 2007b). Autonomic computing leads to 
intelligent behaviours such as those driven through goals and inferences (Wang, 2007b). The theoretical 
and engineering foundations for autonomic computing together with a comprehensive set of theoretical 
foundations that is, cognitive informatics, behaviours, and intelligent science have been identified and 
the theorems for imperative and autonomic computing provide a solid foundation for the application of 
the field of autonomic computing to engineering applications (Wang, 2007b). 
 Autonomic Computing is one of the trans-disciplinary applications of Cognitive Informatics and an 
autonomic computing system using its intelligence can autonomously carry out its actions based on the 
set of events and goals (Wang, 2007a; 2007b). This contrasts with an imperative system whose 
behaviour is controlled by a stored program and is thus deterministic. The motivation for autonomic 
systems is to deal with the system complexity, which has reached an overwhelming proportion and is 
inspired by the human nervous system (Poslad, 2011). 
The increase in system complexity and applications heterogeneity has made it difficult to process the 
information. This has necessitated the use of paradigms inspired by biological systems such as autonomic 
computing (Parashar and Hariri, 2005) that have a goal to realise systems and applications which operate 
autonomously based on high level rules to meet the system mission.  It differs from Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) in that unlike those systems the ultimate decision may be taken by the human operator  
The basic idea of the Autonomic Computing paradigm is that the system should be intelligent to 
enable it to develop and maintain itself in an optimised state. The human body’s feedback and control 
mechanisms (Kephart and Chess, 2003; Parashar and Hariri, 2005) have formed the basis of general 
systems theory and holism for the development and management of computer based systems. The 
autonomic computing paradigm mimics the autonomic human nervous system. The ability to self-
manage SCADA system security threats by developing learning systems that recognise vulnerabilities 
will be hugely advantageous. The agents and software services will form a part of the systems, gathering 
data and monitoring systems continuously (Yang et al., 2005).  
Autonomic computing can result from the use of different technologies, however an autonomic 
system must demonstrate the following four main features: self-configuring; self-healing; self-
optimising; and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003):  
1) Self-configuring: The system must be able to reconfigure its behaviour based on the changing 
system requirements. For example, to acquire more system resources, such as memory,  in case the 
system is overburdened. 
2) Self-healing: In response to detecting a compromised element in its configurtion, or lack of 
resources, an autonomic system can respond by repairing itself to a good state. Based on this assessment 
the system should be able to, for example, isolate the system components that have been compromised 
and continue operation with the remaining elements and at the same time attemping to restore the 
compromised system elements. 
3) Self-optimising: The system must be able to assess the current state of the system variables and be 
abe to tune them to result in an optimised tuned behaviour. This is crucial as in the case of complex 
systems there are thousands of system parameters that can affect the system performance. Knowing or 
applying them all for best results is beyond the grasp of the human mind, in a resonable amount of time. 
4) Self-protecting: The system should be aware of the normal system operation and be able to 
continuously monitor the current system state to determine when deviations occur. It can then take 
measures to contain the threat and to handle it  
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Autonomic computing facilitates identifying factors that relate to a specific state – homeostasis. The 
development of a knowledge network will help to identify what ‘homeostasis’ is and when there is an 
imbalance, to understand the structure of the network, the defences, the threats and the attacks.  The 
threats can be classified into two categories: 1) process-related: when valid credentials are used to make 
legitimate changes that can impact on industrial processes. These can also be due to an error in the input 
of incorrect values or an actual attack (Crawford, 2006) by, for example, disgruntled employees; and 2) 
system-related: which are exploited via software or configuration vulnerabilities. For example, flaws in 
communication protocols, which are low level (layers 1 and 2) attacks on the SCADA architecture 
(Pidikiti et al., 2013).  Developing a mechanism to mine logged data on process-related incidents is a 
potential solution to developing an autonomic computing approach for SCADA security. Identifying 
user activities and classifying the actions into signed-on or known user actions allows the analysis of 
threats as legitimate system commands by legitimate users, or by illegitimate users, to distinguish the 
threats into attacks or errors by developing a knowledge base (Hadžiosmanović et al., 2012).  
The autonomic computing system incorporated to monitor a SCADA system may generate false 
alarms and therefore it may be necessary, based on the application domain, for a human operator to 
make a final decision based on the evidence.   
 
5. ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK  FOR SCADA SECURITY 
 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the architectures proposed in the research literature and 
propose a framework that can be used to design SCADA systems that have built-in layered protection 
against both known and unknown threats. 
An autonomic system enables a SCADA system to optimise, configure and protect itself in case of 
changing the system state to a compromised one. The work to date for securing SCADA security focuses 
on discrete approaches. However, we propose an integrated approach that combines, the discrete 
knowledge based approaches with cognitive approaches. The memory layer of the Layered Reference 
Model of the Brain (LRMB) (layer 2), reflects the knowledge base that captures the short term, long term 
and transient memories. This can be utilised to capture process- and systems-related threats. Memory can 
be defined as a set of subconscious cognitive processes that retain the external or internal information 
about various SCADA security events. The subconscious knowledge base is inherited from the range of 
events and threats identified, and the conscious subsystem, however, is acquired and flexible, based on 
the autonomic computing paradigm (Wang et al., 2006a; Wang and Wang, 2006b).  
Some autonomic architectures have been proposed in the research literature. The IBM autonomic 
computing system comprises, monitoring, analysing, planning, executing and a knowledge base 
component (Ebbers et al., 2006) and was proposed for large-scale commercial systems. The architecture 
utilises Touchpoint Autonomic Managers that are self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing and self-
protecting.  
An introduction to autonomic computing together with the challenges and opportunities are presented 
in Parashar and Hariri (2005). An Ultrastable system is discussed with reference to living organisms and 
human nervous system. The authors highlight the challenges in designing the general purpose systems 
that can address the emerging needs and complexity of services and applications. They propose 
architecture for an autonomic element as a smallest functional unit and propose a manager for each 
autonomic element. 
Chen and Abdelwahed (2014) highlight the need for better security for the SCADA system and 
present an autonomic security model comprising of risk assessment, early warning and prevention, 
intrusion detection, and intrusion response. The signature based detection techniques can only be useful 
against known attacks whereas the anomaly based detection techniques have a high false alarm rate. 
Similarly demilitarised zones, access controls and firewalls do not provide adequate protection as with 
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time the attackers learn the vulnerabilities of the communication protocols and those of the operating 
system. 
A detailed survey of autonomic computing models and applications is provided by Huebscher and 
McCann(2008). An Autonomic Critical Infrastructure Protection (ACIP) system using anomaly detection 
and autonomic computing is proposed by Al-Baalbaaki and Al-Nashif (2013). The modular system has 
online monitoring, feature selection and correlation, multi-level behaviour analysis, visualisation, and 
adaptive learning. The evaluation of ACIP is described using Modbus traffic generator for the Modbus 
traces between a server and five different PLCs. The proposed system could detect and stop a variety of 
attacks on the Modbus protocol (Al-Baalbaaki and Al-Nashif, 2013).  
 It was shown that by incorporating knowledge of a physical model of the system it was possible to 
identify the attacks through changes in system behaviour (Cardenas et al., 2011). The detection of attacks 
was formulated as anomaly-based intrusion detection. The results show that the response algorithm keeps 
the system in a safe state during an attack. Automatic response mechanisms were proposed on system 
state estimation.  However, they caution that an automatic detection and response methodology might not 
be applicable for all processes in control systems.  
A methodology for designing a smart critical architecture that protects communications, controls and 
computations using moving target defence and autonomic computing is proposed by Hariri et al. and also 
develop a Resilient Smart Critical Infrastructure Testbed (RSCIT). A general autonomic computing 
environment (Autonomia) was developed for control and management of smart critical infrastructures.  
A survivable cyber-secure infrastructures (SCI) architecture is proposed by Sheldon et al. (2004) for a 
power grid and proposes a cognitive agent architecture combining agent-based and autonomic 
computing. Cognitive components are described as comprising of processes that are reactive, deliberate, 
or reflective. 
In contrast to the architectures above, our proposed architecture combines three features to provide a 
threat-resilient SCADA framework: (i) virtualisation of computing and networking resources (ii) 
hierarchy of autonomic managers (AMs) to identify threats at different scales (iii) protection against false 
alarms.  
Virtualisation refers to creating a virtual rather than physical version of computer hardware, storage 
and networks. The advantages are that the computing resources can be elastically assigned as required 
and it is much easier to monitor the virtual machines. In case of a cyber attack, a clean instance can be 
easily launched and the compromised machine can be isolated for forensics. Also, Disaster recovery and 
rollback can be performed easily.  We propose hosting the SCADA system on a virtual platform. The 
advantages are that it can provide high availability through protection against hardware and software 
failures. Thus creating a broad generalised structure based on virtualisation wherein appropriate 
technologies can be selected to best suit an application within the given framework. 
We propose the concept of hierarchical autonomic managers that can scale protection from a small to 
a wide area. A domain autonomic manager, 𝐴𝑀𝑑 performs real-time analysis of their limited domain 
(database, communications, etc.,) at a small scale. These domain-based analyses are then aggregated at 
the local system level, 𝐴𝑀𝑙 for identification of anomalies to counter the threats locally. This relieves the 
central autonomic manager, 𝐴𝑀𝑐 to take more holistic actions. Thus, a central autonomic manager can 
perform an analysis of system wide aggregated analysis  to counter system wide variations to identify 
possible threats. 
Thus, the inference of AM is based on the intelligent aggregation of the inferences of its lower level 
AM. 
Inferences 𝐴𝑀𝑐 = ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐴𝑀𝑙
𝑁
𝑖=1  
We argue that despite the current state-of-the-art in autonomic computing applications, such as, 
machine learning and neural networks applied to SCADA systems, the ultimate decision should lie with 
the human operator. This is due to the criticality of the SCADA applications that might jeopardise the 
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safety and health of people, or compromise national security and infrastructures in case of false alarms. 
This of course, will vary from one application to another and a human decision-maker could be in the 
loop at some or all layers of AMs. The hierarchy of autonomic managers abstracts the information as it 
proceeds from low to high levels (domain to global) and can recommend actions to make it easier for a 
human operator to make a decision. 
 The structure and execution cycle of an AM is shown in Fig 3. It plans based on the given goals and 
rules,  executes its plan which could be monitoring, comparison, infers the result of its execution to be an 
anomaly or a progression towards one, reports the inference to its higher AM. The knowledge base is 
analogous to the human nervous system storing structured and unstructured information used by the 




Fig 3. Structure and execution cycle of an autonomic manager. 
 
 The autonomic manager, as shown in Fig 3, can be used at various security layers of the system. The 
hierarchy helps to place the inferences at appropriate levels and the intelligence can travel up to the 
highest layer, that is, the central AM.  
 A SCADA system can have a large geographical spread, exposing it to exploitation at many locations, 
therefore necessitating an autonomic manager at each location that can monitor the security in the local 
areas and coordinate the efforts through the central manager. A simplified SCADA system architecture is 
shown in Figure 4. At the heart of the system is a central autonomic manager, that can enforce the broad 
threat mitigation and containment policies in the managed system as defined by the system administrator. 
The knowledge base provides the various historical system models that are continuously modified to the 
current state and are analysed to check conformance. The local autonomic managers continually observe 
the system state and act promptly in case of identified security threats to the local system. 
Our proposed architecture provides a broad generalised structure based on virtualisation wherein 
appropriate technologies can be selected to best suit an application within the given framework. The 
identification of anomalies at an area level helps to counter the threats locally, relieving the central 
autonomic manager to take more holistic actions to counter system wide threats. 





Fig 4. Proposed Architecture for an autonomic SCADA system. 
 
It is also pertinent to point out here that the autonomic manager itself can be the target of a cyber 
attack. Such exploitation can be avoided through redundant deployments of managers and an integrated 
approach as proposed.     
6. CONCLUSION 
The evolving cyber threat landscape dictates changes to cyber defence approaches for the protection of 
SCADA systems. Unlike the traditional defence approaches where the response is governed by tailoring 
and monitoring according to threats, the concept of autonomic computing provides an advantage, as the 
systems are self-protecting. Thus, the cognitive and autonomic computing paradigms are very promising 
to develop SCADA system cyber security architectures that facilitate proactive threat mitigation 
methodologies. The autonomous nature enables flexible and scalable solutions across a wide range of 
SCADA system architectures and applications.  
This paper provides an overview of the autonomic computing based architectures for SCADA security. 
We propose the concept of hierarchical autonomic managers that helps to extract, aggregate and refine 
intelligent inferences for ultimate decision making by a human operator. The proposed framework is 
generic and can be suitably applied across a range of real-world SCADA applications. 
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